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Introduction  
In this chapter, we describe and compare the institutional development of municipal 
waste management in Norway and the Netherlands. Our focus is on the period from the 
1970s to the present. We explore how local governments have reorganised internally 
and externally in this period of shifting and varying financial pressures. The guiding 
assumption of the book is that the organisation of local public services has gone through 
three developmental stages, from originally being organised in-house, through the New 
Public Management-epoch of disaggregation, autonomisation and contractualisation 
(Pollitt et al., 2004), maybe even privatisation, to the contemporary period of post-NPM 
and re-municipalisation (Wollmann & Marcou, 2010). The research question in this 
chapter relates to whether these developmental stages can be observed in the field of 
municipal waste management in Norway and the Netherlands.  We compare these two 
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countries because they are relatively similar in many respects but quite different in 
terms of crisis experience. While the term crisis may be true in the case of the 
Netherlands in the 1980s (‘the Dutch disease’) and the post-2008 period, Norway has so 
far managed to sail clear of the worst effects of the international regressions, due to its 
strong oil-lubricated economy (Löffler, 2003: 479; Statistics Norway, 2008). This 
difference in terms of crisis experience leads us to expect that reform pressures may 
have been stronger in the Netherlands and thus have resulted in a different reform 
trajectory or different organisational solutions than in Norway. Furthermore, the local 
government systems of Norway and the Netherlands show significant similarities but at 
the same time exhibit important differences. Lidström (1996) for instance labels Norway 
as North European and the Netherlands as Napoleonic, while John (2001) describes both 
countries as belonging to the northern group, although he also recognises the legacy of 
Napoleonic influences on Dutch local government. A basic characteristic of the Nordic 
welfare states is the dominating role of local government, primarily municipalities in 
public service provision. The Napoleonic system is characterised by a strong centralised 
state, detailed control of local government by state prefects and mayors appointed by 
national government. However, decentralisation reforms have gradually reduced the 
differences between countries belonging to this group and the Nordic countries 
(Lidström, 1996), and this is certainly true at the local government level in the 
Netherlands. These similarities would lead us to expect a similar reform trajectory in 
both countries.   
 
To address the research question and these expectations, we use a typology developed 
by Van Thiel (2012). This typology enables us to analyse whether the emergence of 
organisational forms in the three different stages has occurred in the same or in different 
ways in the field of waste management in both countries. 
 
We find that the trajectory of reform in Norway and the Netherlands does not match the 
assumption of the three developmental stages as expected. Moreover, there are 
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significant differences between the two countries in the way waste management is 
organised in these stages. In the Netherlands, the most significant NPM-related changes 
have taken place in the 1970s and 1980s, while in Norway these have taken place from 
the 1990s onwards. In relation to the last stage, we do not find any convincing signs of 
re-municipalisation in any of the two countries in the field of waste management. We do 
however observe a strong tendency towards ‘inter-municipalisation’ in a variety of 
forms, in spite of differences in terms of crisis experience.  
 
In the following sections, we first present a typology of agencies before addressing the 
policy field of waste management. Thereafter, we analyse the three stages of local 
institutional reform in this field. The chapter concludes with a comparative discussion 
where we try to explain why the two countries which have marked differences in crisis 
experience end up with a rather similar institutional response in the policy field of waste 
management.  
Conceptualisation 
Describing and analysing public service provision across national borders can often be a 
challenging task in terms of identifying comparable organisational forms and finding 
common labels. This is not only a problem of language but also of institutional and legal 
regulations and traditions. In this section, we present a theoretical framework related to 
agentification theory and based on a typology developed by Van Thiel (2012). The 
intention is to make comparison between the two countries easier, irrespective of 
differences in language and institutional legacy.  
 
Agentification1 may be defined as a process whereby local government (as principal) 
starts to disaggregate its service provision into more or less autonomous operative units 
                         
1 We prefer this term instead of agencification in order to underline a link to agency theory and to make 
the approach more general. 
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or agencies (agents) and regulates the relationship between itself and these units by 
contracts or quasi-contracts (Pollitt et al., 2004). Although this perspective was originally 
applied for analysing processes at the national level, we find it useful for processes at the 
local level as well. In Table 1 we use this perspective to identify the institutional forms at 
the local government level in Norway and the Netherlands. 
 
Table 1. Types of agencies at the local level in Norway and the Netherlands  
Type Definition Forms at the local level 
0 Unit or directory of the local government Traditional in-house provision: 
decentralisation rather than 
agentification 
1 Semi-autonomous organisation, unit or 
body without legal independence but 
with considerable managerial autonomy 
In-house provision by ‘agentified’ units 
or municipal companies (in N: 
resultatenheter and kommunalt foretak 
(KF); in NL: gemeentebedrijven) and 
forms of inter-municipal cooperation 
that are not legally independent2 
2 Legally independent organisation with 
managerial autonomy (in principle public 
law based) 
Inter-municipal  companies (in NL:  
Gemeenschappelijke Regeling (GR), in 
N: interkommunalt selskap (IKS)) 
3 Organisation established by or on behalf 
of the local government such as a 
foundation, corporation, company or 
enterprise (private law based) 
Limited companies (in N: aksjeselskap 
(AS); in NL: overheidsvennootschappen) 
4 Tendering and contracting out to public 
(for example other municipalities) or 
private organisations 
 
Source: based on Van Thiel (2012: 20).  
 
Type 0 agencies are actually not agencies and not at arm’s length from local government. 
This type comprises traditional in-house provision. Type 1 agencies are at arm's length 
from local government but do not have legal personality, while type 2 and 3 agencies do 
have legal personality. Type 2 agencies are public law based, while type 3 agencies are 
                         
2 We discuss the different types in the two countries in the next sections. 
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private law based. With regard to type 4 agencies, the local government that contracts 
out to a public or private organisation does not have an ownership relation with that 
organisation as is the case in type 2 and 3 agencies. 
 
The policy field of waste management 
In most Western European countries waste management is a municipal responsibility, 
although in some cases (Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK) the service is split between, for 
instance, the county/province and the municipality (John, 2001: 36). In Norway, this 
responsibility is primarily linked to household waste where municipalities also have a 
monopoly. The Pollution and Waste Disposal (PWD) Act of 1981 instructs municipalities 
to ‘make arrangements for the collection of household waste’ (§ 30), and no one may 
collect this type of waste without the consent of the municipality. The law has been 
amended several times, the last time in 2013. The Norwegian Environment Agency 
(NEA)3 has the supreme authority to oversee and regulate how the municipalities 
practice their obligations according to this law. It may also order municipalities to collect 
special waste and oblige owners/manufacturers of this type of waste and industrial 
waste to deliver it to a municipal waste treatment centre. Over time, public regulations 
have gradually become stronger and more detailed, for example, requiring separate 
collection and treatment of different types of refuse. Fees for household waste are 
determined by the municipal councils and should not exceed the actual total cost of 
providing the service.  
 
In the Netherlands, traditionally household waste collection has been the concern of 
municipalities and was practiced initially only on a small scale. With the increase in the 
amount of waste, the Dutch central government thought it necessary to develop a more 
integrated approach to waste disposal. With the Waste Act of 1979 (integrated into the 
Environmental Management Act in 1994) public bodies at various government levels 
                         
3 Miljødirektoratet. 
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were given legally specified tasks and responsibilities regarding the formulation, 
operationalisation and implementation of waste policy (De Jong & Wolsink, 1997). The 
provinces were responsible for formulating plans on the disposal of household waste, 
while municipalities were responsible for the implementation of these plans (Vereniging 
van Nederlandse Gemeenten, 1979). Dutch waste collection policy focuses on prevention 
and separation of waste and specific recycling circuits. Prevention is one of the main 
priorities of waste policy. Since 1994, municipalities have had the obligation to supply an 
infrastructure for separate collection of organic waste. In addition, they have to provide 
facilities for the separate collection of glass, paper, textiles, electronic products and 
hazardous materials. Furthermore, local authorities are free to decide how citizens have 
to pay for waste collection, on the basis of a volume-, frequency-, bag- or weight-based 
pricing system.  
 
Institutional set-up of municipal waste management 
A major challenge in describing and analysing the organisational development of waste 
management is the lack of research in the field (Smith, 2014). At this stage, therefore, 
we have to resort to a combination of general description of municipal service provision 
organisation, case studies and public statistics.  
 
Public-centred delivery  
Norway (pre-1990s) 
During the 20-25 year period from the mid-1960s to the mid-/late 1980s, Norwegian 
municipalities went through several reforms intent on enabling them to harness the task 
of implementing ambitious national welfare policies: the amalgamation reform in 1964 
and the reorganisation reform in the 1980s, aligning four political subcommittees and 
administrative structure. Public services, especially within the dominating policy areas of 
education and health and social services, requiring formal professional training and 
authorisation, were placed in the hands of public employees (type 0). As for technical 
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services, including waste management, the situation seems to have varied more, for 
instance, depending on size and density of population and settlement patterns. 
Traditionally, there has been a more pragmatic openness to the use of private 
subcontractors in this field (type 0 and 4). Therefore, when the PWD Act of 1981 placed 
the responsibility for providing household waste collection and treatment in the hands 
of the municipalities, they were free to organise it as they saw fit.  
 
The Netherlands (pre-1980s) 
In the Netherlands, waste management has long since been a task for the municipalities. 
In the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, local governments 
established municipal services to collect and dispose of household waste (type 0). 
Although municipalities bear the responsibility for the periodical collection of household 
waste from any property on the municipalities’ territories, already under the Waste Act 
of 1979 municipalities are explicitly allowed to decide whether to provide this service in-
house, to contract it out to a private firm (type 4) or to organise household waste 
collection in cooperation with other municipalities (type 2). Local governments were 
even encouraged to cooperate in household waste management (VNG, 1979). 
Furthermore, in 1950 a special law, the Joint Provisions Act, was enacted to stimulate 
and regulate cooperation between municipalities (Hulst, 2005: 101).  
 
NPM reforms  
Norway (1990s onwards) 
While the waves of neo-liberalism and NPM spread in the 1980s, first in the English-
speaking countries and later in Europe and other parts of the world, Norwegian public 
opinion and the public sector seemed rather hesitant and even reluctant to embark on 
this voyage. Olsen (1996) used the metaphor ‘tortoise’ to describe Norway’s position. It 
was during the 1990s that the NPM ideas first started to influence public discourse and 
reforms in any significant way (Klausen & Ståhlberg, 1998).  
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In 1992 the new Local Government Act was passed, opening up opportunities for 
municipalities to organise their administrations generally as they liked. The act marked a 
milestone in the development of Norwegian local government, gradually leading to less 
standardisation and more variation in organisational forms. This new freedom seems to 
have opened up a window of opportunity for the introduction of NPM-inspired 
principles and practices. A general feature of the reforms now emerging was to separate 
politics and administration and to design arm’s length structures. Two reforms, with 
special relevance for our topic, illustrate this feature: the ‘agency’ model and the 
municipal companies.  
 
The first reform, the agency model, is an example of internal agentification – Van Thiel 
(2004) uses the term internal autonomisation – whereby service-providing units, for 
instance, waste services, are structurally more separated from the strategic apex of the 
municipal administration and given a higher degree of autonomy to make decisions 
concerning internal operational matters (economy, personnel, organisation) than before. 
They remain however legally integrated parts of the municipality. Also, contract-like 
agreements were set up to formulate the performance obligations of the agency 
managers towards the municipal CEO (Torsteinsen, 2012). In other words, they were 
transformed into type 1 ‘agents’ in relation to the ‘principal’, the CEO (rådmann).  
 
The second reform, the creation and use of municipal companies (type 2 and 3) in public 
service-provision, also gained momentum during the 1990s (Ringkjøb et al., 2008; 
Bjørnsen et al., 2015). Besides many pragmatic grounds, there was a strong belief that 
‘companification’ or ‘corporatisation’ would result in greater transparency, thereby 
making accountability and control easier to obtain. Further, many grounds for 
introducing company forms had a pragmatic character. For example, the traditional 
organisational set-up in local government was perceived as less and less adapted to the 
growing scope and complexity of municipal service provision. This explanation, in 
addition to the fact that Norwegian municipalities are rather small, may have made 
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municipal companies an attractive solution, especially within policy fields of low political 
controversy like, for instance, waste management. Service provision through municipal 
companies makes it easier to facilitate and formalise inter-municipal cooperation, 
thereby avoiding highly controversial amalgamation processes.  
 
The private law limited company (AS) is the most prevalent form and accounts for more 
than 80 per cent of all municipal companies (type 3), compared with 66 per cent in 2003. 
Further, public law company forms are the inter-municipal company (IKS), based on the 
Inter-Municipal Company Act of 1999 (type 2) and the municipal firm (KF), regulated 
according to an amendment of 1999 in the Local Government Act (type 1). The IKS is, 
like the AS, a separate legal entity with its own board of directors. However, it is not a 
limited liability company like the AS; the participating municipalities are responsible for 
the IKS’s total economic obligations on a pro-rata basis. The KF, however, does not hold a 
separate legal status.  
 
Given our focus on waste management, the IKS and the AS are the most relevant and 
interesting forms of municipal companies. After a period of considerable reorganisation, 
from in-house and private sector provision to provision through inter-municipal 
companies, the inter-municipal companies represent the most prevalent form in terms 
of the total number of municipalities that they serve; now 334 municipalities out of a 
total of 428 municipalities (78 per cent) cooperate in almost 60 IKS-form companies; 63 
organise their waste services through 17 inter-municipal AS-companies, whereas 28 
municipalities run this service in-house (see Table 2). In addition, some municipalities 
have exposed their waste service to competitive tendering, resulting in (often partially) 
out-of-municipality provision, either by public companies from other municipalities or 
private companies. All in all, waste management appears to be one of the municipal 
services in Norway with the highest degree of variation in organisational forms (The 
competition authorities of the Nordic countries, 1998).  
10 
 
 
The Netherlands (1980s onwards)  
In comparison with Norway, in the Netherlands at the end of the seventies the interest 
in contracting out and inter-municipal cooperation with regard to waste collection had 
already increased. One of the most important arguments for contracting out or 
cooperating with other municipalities was to improve the efficiency of policy 
implementation and to reduce costs as an answer to the need to achieve cutbacks and 
enhance the quality of public services (Van Thiel, 2004). The expectation was that the 
market could perform some of the tasks more efficiently and effectively (Ter Bogt, 1998). 
Furthermore, smaller municipalities in particular expected to gain economies of scale by 
contracting out or cooperating with other municipalities. Another argument for these 
reforms was to separate policy and administration so that politicians, policy makers and 
policy implementers could concentrate on their core business (Van Thiel, 2004). The 
total number of tasks was growing rapidly, and, to prevent overload, it was held that 
tasks that were not genuinely public in character should not be provided by local 
governments.  
 
Against this background, local governments rapidly changed the institutional form of 
waste collection. Consequently, a variety of institutional modes came into being. The 
two alternative modes that were chosen the most were contracting out to a private firm 
(type 4) and inter-municipal cooperation (type 2). In 1984, 249 municipalities out of a 
total of 750 municipalities (33 per cent) contracted out waste collection to a private firm 
(Bokkes, 1989). In the case of contracting out, activities are conducted by private 
organisations, but local governments are still engaged as commissioner (Ter Bogt, 2003). 
In this mode of production, local governments put the production of a service out to 
tender. Usually, the lowest bidder gets the award. Contracts differ in duration but are 
generally short-term for a fixed number of years (three to five) (Van Genugten, 2008).  
 
The number of inter-municipal cooperations also increased in the period from 1978 to 
11 
 
1982 by 112 municipalities (Bokkes, 1989). In the inter-municipal cooperations 
municipalities establish a separate legal entity, with transfer of authority, in which they 
have both governance (that is voting rights or a representative on the board) and 
financial interests (De Kruijf, 2011). These inter-municipal companies are mostly single 
purpose organisations and are established on the basis of public law (more specifically, 
the Joint Provisions Act). They take the form of a public body or joint organ. The 
participating municipalities – burgomaster, aldermen or members of the local councils – 
are members of the supervisory board and the board of directors and in that role have 
final responsibility. Furthermore, local governments enter into service level agreements 
in which the requirements of the tasks are stipulated. Governments can only withdraw 
from the inter-municipal company by paying a fine (Van Genugten, 2008).  
 
At the end of the 1990s a new institutional mode became popular in the Netherlands: 
the private law based limited company (type 3). After 2000, Dutch local governments 
increasingly chose this institutional form because they were experiencing high decision-
making costs because of the multiple board levels in the public law based inter-
municipal cooperations. They were hesitant to contract out to private firms because they 
did not think that the continuity and quality of service delivery could be guaranteed. 
With a limited company, they expected to stay in control of the company, while at the 
same time benefiting from the scale effects – most limited companies are owned by 
more than one municipality – and therefore a reduction of costs.  
 
Like inter-municipal cooperations, limited companies are separate legal entities at arm’s 
length from the local administration. Local governments are shareholders of the 
company and at the same time, as commissioners, they have a long-term contractual 
relationship with the limited company as their agent (Van Genugten, 2008). Local 
governments have crucial powers by virtue of their shareholding. For example, they have 
powers to appoint and discharge the executive board and the supervisory board of the 
limited company and to influence the main lines of its strategic policy (Van Genugten, 
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2008). Furthermore, local governments enter into service level agreements in which the 
requirements of the tasks are stipulated. Aspects of the production of the public service, 
for example quantity, quality and price, are specified in the contract. Governments can 
only withdraw from the limited company by paying a fine (Van Genugten, 2008). The rise 
in limited companies in this period is primarily at the expense of in-house municipal 
services, although there is a small decline in contracting out to a private firm and inter-
municipal cooperation too.   
 
In 2014, one in six municipalities collected waste themselves, while in one third of the 
municipalities waste collection was organised by a limited company, and in another third 
it was contracted out to a private firm (see Table 2). Contracting out to private 
companies is still mainly chosen by small municipalities, while municipal services can 
mainly be found in large municipalities (Rijkswaterstaat Leefomgeving, 2014). 
 
Effects of NPM reforms in both countries 
As to the effects of different forms of organising waste collection and treatment in 
Norway and the Netherlands, only a few studies are available. In a Norwegian study, 
Sørensen (2007) argues that in some cases dispersed and indirect ownership, as in inter-
municipal companies, leads to efficiency losses that are greater than the gains of 
economies of scale. User fees and costs are about 10 per cent higher when waste 
services are provided by such companies compared with services provided by a single 
municipality. On the other hand, a couple of studies indicate that arm’s length waste 
management stimulates entrepreneurship and innovation (Smith, 2014; Andersen & 
Torsteinsen, 2015).  
 
In the Netherlands, studies have mainly investigated the economic effects of the 
different institutional forms. Based on 1996-data Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) show that 
on average outside provision leads to 15 per cent lower total costs than in-house 
provision. In two later studies, they show that this result is not stable over time. The cost 
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advantage of private provision in the period 1998–2010 is much larger at the beginning 
than at the end, when costs for municipalities with private provision rise significantly 
(Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2008). Furthermore, short-term contracts (up to 5 years) with 
private providers are nearly always the most cost-saving option. However, overall the 
cost advantage of inter-municipal cooperation turns out be larger than private provision 
(Dijkgraaf & Gradus, 2013). In addition, a study of the transaction costs of the different 
institutional forms shows that municipalities with a limited company have a higher level 
of transaction costs than in-house provision and municipalities that contract out to 
private firms (Van Genugten, 2008).  
 
Post-NPM – has it started? 
There are few if any signs of a post-NPM development in Norwegian municipalities. 
However, the share of municipalities practising the agency model has levelled off and 
lately decreased (Blåka et al., 2012). Also, most municipalities have started to merge 
some of their agencies into larger organisational entities (Olsen & Torsteinsen, 2012). As 
for municipal companies, the growth in numbers also seems to have levelled off lately 
(Bjørnsen et al., 2015). At the same time, we find no convincing signs of municipalities 
dissolving municipal companies and moving tasks back in-house. Quite the opposite, 
there are increasing pressures from the EU to liberalise the waste market and open it up 
to private business, an idea that seems to be met with sympathy in the liberal-
conservative government now in power. This being said, many municipalities seem to 
have kept at least rudimentary administrative functions in-house to oversee the 
statutory obligations linked to waste management.  
 
Nor do we find any signs of post-NPM development in local waste collection in the 
Netherlands. In 2015, after decades of institutional change, the waste market can be 
qualified as rather stable. In the future only incidental changes are to be expected  or 
changes that will be the result of the reduction of the number of Dutch municipalities 
because of municipal amalgamations.  
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Comparison of reform trajectories 
Comparing the institutional developments in Norway and the Netherlands, we observe 
that local waste management has undergone many reforms in both countries. First, the 
Netherlands seems to enter the NPM-age a decade before Norway. In the Netherlands 
we observe the enactment of many reforms in the 1980s and the rise of a large diversity 
of types, namely type 1, 2 and 4 agencies, while reforms are still limited in Norway at 
that time, with type 0 agencies as the main form and some type 4 agencies. Second, 
from 1990 to the present, we observe the development of type 3 agencies in the 
Netherlands, although other types remain popular. In comparison, there are more 
reforms in Norway in this period with the rise of type 1, 2 and 3 agencies. In the post-
NPM stage, we observe a consolidation of a large variety of comparable institutional 
forms in both countries with an emphasis on inter-municipal cooperation. In Norway the 
inter-municipal company (type 2) is the dominating organisational form, while in the 
Netherlands the limited company (type 3) and contracting out (type 4) are the most 
prevalent forms. 
 
Table 2. Institutional forms of waste management in Norway and the Netherlands 2013–2014 
Type  Institutional  
form 
Norway The Netherlands 
  No. of 
munici-
palities 
(M) 
Per cent 
of M 
No. of 
munici-
palities 
(M) 
Per cent 
of M 
0&1 In-house, 
decentralised 
& agentified 
units 
28 6.6 60 15 
2 Inter-
municipal 
companies 
334 78.0 60 15 
3 Limited 
companies 
63 14.7 121 30 
4 Contracting 3 0.7 145 36 
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out to 
public* or 
private 
companies 
Sum  428 100.0 386 96** 
Source: Norway, based on www.loop.no and own calculations; the Netherlands, based on 
Rijkswaterstaat Leefomgeving (2014). *municipal, inter-municipal, limited companies and so on 
**only 96% of the Dutch municipalities are included here because 4% of the municipalities have 
an institutional form that does not fit into the typology.  
 
In spite of the fact that the Netherlands was hit hard by the oil crisis in the 1970s and 
the financial crisis in 2008, while Norway was hardly hit at all, both countries have 
developed relatively similar organisational solutions for municipal waste, although they 
were introduced at different points in time. This could indicate similarities in institutional 
conditions (decentralised public service provision, strong local identities), isomorphic 
pressures (NPM-inspired agentification) and structural configurations (municipalities too 
small to harvest the economies of scale necessary for waste management).   
 
Conclusion  
The reform trajectory of waste management in Norway and the Netherlands does not 
match the three developmental stages discussed in the introduction. Moreover, there 
are significant differences in the reform trajectories of Norway and the Netherlands. In 
the Netherlands the most significant NPM-related changes (second stage) have taken 
place in the 1970s and 1980s, while in Norway these have taken place from the 1990s 
onwards. Nonetheless, increasing agentification seems to be a common feature. In 
relation to the last stage, we do not find any convincing signs of re-municipalisation in 
the field of waste management. The main explanation for this is that the influence of 
NPM in these countries never led to the massive de-municipalisation and privatisation of 
local services – and more specifically waste management – that seem to have affected 
the larger European societies, for example Germany (Dreyfus et al., 2010). Although 
agentification has left its mark on local government in Norway and the Netherlands, 
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ownership has always been and still is mostly in the hands of local government. Instead 
of re-municipalisation we observe a strong focus on inter-municipalisation in a variety of 
forms. 
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